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NOTE
"Now FOR A CLEAN SWEEP!":
SMILEY V. HOLM, PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING,
AND AT-LARGE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
Benedict J. Schweigert*
The 1930 Census reduced Minnesota's apportionment in the U.S.
House of Representatives from ten to nine, requiring the state to
draw new congressional districts. The Republican-led state legisla-
ture passed a gerrymandered redistricting bill in an attempt to
insulate its nine incumbents in the state's delegation from the
party's expected loss of the statewide popular vote to the insurgent
Farmer-Labor Party. When the Farmer-Labor Governor, Floyd
B. Olson, vetoed the redistricting bill, the legislature claimed the bill
could take effect without the governor's signature. In Smiley v.
Holm, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the veto was
effective and that because Minnesota therefore had no validly en-
acted congressional districts, it must elect all nine of its congressmen
at-large. In the ensuing election, voters swept from power all but two
of the sitting congressmen and reduced the Republicans from nine
seats to three. This Note presents a historical case study of the
events surrounding Smiley and the 1932 congressional elections in
Minnesota and uses it to discuss the benefits and costs of at-large
elections. It determines that in this case, the at-large elections
effectively blocked countermajoritarian tactics in the 1932 and sub-
sequent elections without some of the negative consequences usually
ascribed to at-large elections.
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INTRODUCTION
Partisan gerrymandering is a serious contemporary concern, but it is not
a new problem. Since at least 1811, when a newspaper editor invented the
term to refer to a redistricting scheme by Massachusetts Governor Elbridge
Gerry,' political parties have used clever line-drawing to protect their in-
cumbents and ensure that they are overrepresented in legislative bodies
relative to their support in the electorate. In this way, parties attempt to
maximize their power and retain it, even when a majority2 of the electorate
turns against them.
Minnesota experienced this kind of gerrymandering in the early 1930s.
After the onset of the Great Depression, the Republican Party-which had
dominated state politics for decades-lost statewide public support to the
Farmer-Labor Party.3 The Republicans responded by attempting to retain
their lock on the state's congressional delegation through the redistricting
1. J.W.D., HISTORY OF THE GERRYMANDER, 4-5 (Boston, 1892) ("For the purpose of secur-
ing a democratic representative an absurd and singular arrangement of towns in the county of Essex
was made to compose a district. ... [Painter Gilbert Stuart] took a pencil, and, with a few touches,
added what might be supposed to represent claws. 'There,' said Stuart, 'that will do for a Salaman-
der.' [Newspaper editor Benjamin] Russell, who was busy with his pen, looked up at the hideous
figure, and exclaimed, 'Salamander! call it Gerrymander.'" (quoting 2 JOSEPH T. BUCKINGHAM,
SPECIMENS OF NEWSPAPER LITERATURE 91 (Boston, Redding & Co. 1852))).
2. In 1930s Minnesota, often neither major party could command an outright majority of
votes. Instead, the Republican and Farmer-Labor Parties battled for pluralities, while Democrats and
independent candidates received support from the balance of the electorate. Except where specified,
this Note will treat "plurality" and "majority" situations alike and will treat the terms "counterma-
joritarian," "promajoritarian," and the like as inclusive of the related terms referring to pluralities,
e.g., "counterpluralitarian," "propluralitaian."
3. See generally e.g., MILLARD L. GIESKE, MINNESOTA FARMER-LABORISM: THE THIRD-
PARTY ALTERNATIVE 3-153 (1979).
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process.4 The new Farmer-Labor governor vetoed the state legislature's re-
districting plan. ' The legislature, however, argued that the federal
Constitution excluded the governor from the redistricting process and that
its plan was law.6
In Smiley v. Holm7 the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the
Minnesota Legislature's incumbent-insulating strategy and instead allowed
the new party preferences of the state's voters to find immediate and dra-
matic expression. The Court upheld the governor's veto and ordered at-large
elections for all nine of Minnesota's congressional seats should the state fail
to validly adopt a plan.8 In the at-large elections that followed, voters swept
from power all but two sitting congressmen and reduced the Republican
delegation from nine seats out of ten to three out of nine.9 Rather than face
at-large elections again in 1934, the Minnesota Republicans, still a majority
in the state senate, agreed to a compromise redistricting bill that became law
in 1933.10
This Note presents a historical case study of the circumstances sur-
rounding Smiley and the 1932 congressional elections in Minnesota and uses
it to discuss the benefits and costs of at-large representation. In recent dec-
ades, courts have come to frequently criticize all forms of multimember
representation, including representation at-large. In Connor v. Finch, the
U.S. Supreme Court warned that "the practice of multimember districting
can contribute to voter confusion, make legislative representatives more re-
mote from their constituents, and tend to submerge electoral minorities and
overrepresent electoral majorities."" Other state and federal courts have ex-
pressed similar concerns.12 This Note evaluates the benefits of the Court's
decision in Smiley-blocking a countermajoritarian gerrymander-and con-
trasts them with these concerns.
This Note demonstrates that the decision in Smiley foiled the counterma-
joritarian strategy of the gerrymandering party and altered the redistricting
process so as to hinder such strategies in the future, without some of the
negative consequences frequently ascribed to at-large elections. Part I pro-
vides a theoretical framework for discussing the countermajoritarian threat of
partisan gerrymandering. It identifies desirable traits of a responsive electoral
4. E.g., GEORGE H. MAYER, THE POLITICAL CAREER OF FLOYD B. OLSON 70 (2d. ed. 1987).
5. Id.
6. Id. at71.
7. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
8. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 374-75. For an explanation of at-large representation and other dis-
tricting schemes, see infra Part I.
9. STATE CANVASSING BD., MINN. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, GENERAL ELECTION
REPORT (1932) [hereinafter 1932 Election Results]; STATE CANVASSING BD., MINN. OFFICE OF THE
SEC'Y OF STATE, GENERAL ELECTION REPORT (1930) [hereinafter 1930 Election Results].
10. MAYER, supra note 4, at 139.
11. 431 U.S. 407,415 (1977).
12. E.g., Larios v. Cox, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1218 (N.D. Ga. 2004); Gorin v. Karpan, 775
F. Supp. 1430, 1446 n.23 (D. Wyo. 1991); Legislature v. Reinecke, 492 P.2d 385, 390 (Cal. 1972).
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system that partisan gerrymandering impedes and discusses factors in the
redistricting process that influence the nature of the redistricting plan pro-
duced. Part II explains the political situation in Minnesota that created the
controversy addressed in Smiley, describing its development from the ruling
party's attempt to insulate its incumbents from predicted electoral defeat.
Part III examines the consequences of the Supreme Court's decision, both
for the 1932 elections and for the subsequent final negotiations over redis-
tricting. It concludes that the at-large elections blocked the tactics of the
gerrymandering party, protecting the state from capture by a ruling minority
party. The elections did so without creating severe bias against the minority
party and without provoking voter confusion, although they did fail to dis-
tribute the congressional delegation evenly throughout the state.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Redistricting outcomes are distinguishable from redistricting processes.
Each seat in the House of Representatives represents a particular geographi-
cally defined group of citizens. That group of citizens determines who sits in
that seat. Each seat might represent a distinct group of citizens ("single-
member districts"), more than one seat might represent a larger group of
citizens ("multi-member districts"), or each of the seats apportioned to a
state might represent the entire state ("at-large representation"). 3 The politi-
cal mechanism by which a state determines which group of citizens each
seat represents is its "redistricting process." The redistricting process then
results in a districting plan that assigns particular seats to particular groups
of citizens. This plan is the "redistricting outcome."
Smiley v. Holm dealt with both redistricting outcomes and redistricting
processes. This Part discusses the two issues separately, providing a theo-
retical framework for analyzing each. The later Parts of this Note will use
this framework to compare the gerrymandered plan defeated in Smiley, the
at-large elections ordered by the Court, and the plan finally adopted in 1933.
Section L.A elaborates a framework for evaluating redistricting outcomes
based on their ability to represent the changing preferences of voters effec-
tively and accurately. Section I.B discusses the process of redistricting and
how procedural changes affect redistricting outcomes.
A. Evaluating Redistricting Outcomes
Scholars can plausibly judge a redistricting outcome by how well it pro-
duces representation that reflects the preferences of the people of that state.
The framers established the U.S. House of Representatives to be the organ
of the federal government most responsive to changes in public opinion. At
the Constitutional Convention, James Wilson of Pennsylvania argued that
the House of Representatives must be directly elected because "[t]he legisla-
13. For ease of terminology, this Note will refer to at-large representation as a form of "dis-
tricting."
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ture ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole society. Representa-
tion is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act
collectively."'' 4 In The Federalist No. 52, James Madison agreed, explaining
that the House of Representatives "should have an immediate dependence
on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people."'5
The House of Representatives "represents" the electorate of the United
States in varied ways. An officeholder provides "descriptive" representation
to the extent that she shares the demographic characteristics of her elector-
ate. 16 A preference for single-member districts enshrines one form of
descriptive representation: a member of Congress "represents" her constitu-
ents when she is a member of the same narrowly-defined geographic
community. Descriptive representation also often involves membership in the
constituents' racial or ethnic group.'7 Scholars distinguish such "descriptive"
representation from "substantive" representation, in which elected policymak-
ers represent their constituents by pursuing the voters' policy preferences."
This Note primarily addresses substantive representation, examining district-
ing systems based on their ability to represent the policy preferences of
voters, with partisan affiliation serving as a proxy for policy preferences.
This Note focuses on substantive representation because it is the interest that
the problem of partisan gerrymandering most directly implicates: when par-
ties use gerrymandering to gain disproportionate seat share, they are
attempting to damage the substantive representational interest of their oppo-
nents' supporters. 19
Assuming that party preferences can serve as a proxy for policy prefer-
ences, a state congressional delegation best vindicates the public's
substantive representational interest when the share of seats in the delega-
tion held by each party is the same as the share of votes each party received
statewide. This Note employs the two factors Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz
identified to measure how well a redistricting outcome provides this type of
representation.' First, a set of districts will create a certain level of partisan
bias, defined as "how much larger or smaller a party's seat share is than its
vote share."2' An electoral system more accurately reflects popular sentiment
14. EDWARD J. LARSON & MICHAEL P. WINSHIP, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: A
NARRATIVE HISTORY FROM THE NOTES OF JAMES MADISON 31 (2005).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (James Madison).
16. See, e.g., Elisabeth R. Gerber et al., Minority Representation in Multimember Districts,
92 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 127, 127 (1998).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. At-large election schemes also have important implications for descriptive representa-
tion. This Note will consider one such implication in Section I1I.B.2.
20. GARY W. Cox & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S SALAMANDER: THE ELEC-
TORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 31 (2002).
21. Id.
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when its partisan bias is close to zero." Second, a set of districts will have
more or less responsiveness, defined as "how much party seat shares re-
spond to changes in vote shares."23 An electoral system can more accurately
reflect changes in popular opinion when its responsiveness is high.
Low partisan bias and high responsiveness guarantee availability of two
primary electoral mechanisms by which the voters in a polity exert control
over government policy: determining partisan composition and unseating
incumbents. First, the lower the partisan bias and the greater the responsive-
ness in the electoral system, the more readily a shift in preferences among
voters can recast the composition of the legislature. This power allows vot-
ers to exert control over the government's overall policy direction. They
exercise this control most clearly during a realignment: a moment in which
a majority-determining block of voters removes its support from a party that
has consistently enjoyed that support for a significant period of time and
shifts it to a new party.14 Second, high responsiveness allows voters to con-
trol government policy by holding individual representatives to account.
This accountability has two faces: representatives "vote in accord with their
constituents" because they want to be returned to office, and "voters punish
a representative who votes against his or her district's preferences., 25 Elec-
toral accountability only works, however, in constituencies with competitive
elections. Where one party is reliably dominant in a constituency, the repre-
sentative must commit a proportionately larger transgression to lose an
election because a larger number of partisans must defect. A high level of
responsiveness therefore ensures popular control of government by main-
taining incumbent vulnerability.
Partisan actors gerrymander to reduce responsiveness or to increase par-
tisan bias. 26 Frequently, a state will create districts so full of each
incumbent's partisans that all are secure from challenges arising outside his
or her party. Such a "proincumbent"27 gerrymander may not have a large
partisan bias, but it may be almost totally lacking in responsiveness. Even if
a large group of voters changes its party preference, it may not be large
enough in any one district to create a new partisan majority. The other major
. • , / 28
form of nonracial gerrymander is the "partisan" gerrymander, in which one
party spreads its partisans so as to maximize the number of districts in
22. See Robert S. Erikson, Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Parry Fortunes in Con-
gressional Elections, 66 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1234, 1234 (1972) ("[O]ne reasonable standard of
'fairness' is that the party with the majority of the votes should also be the party with the majority of
the seats.").
23. Cox & KATZ, supra note 20, at 31.
24. See, e.g., John B. Gates, Partisan Realignment, Unconstitutional State Policies, and the
U.S. Supreme Court, 1837-1964, 31 AM. J. POL. Sci. 259, 260 (1987).
25. SEAN M. THERIALLT, THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE: CONGRESSIONAL COMPETITION,
PUBLIc ATTENTION, AND VOTER RETRIBUTION 3 (2005).
26. Cox & KATZ, supra note 20, at 33.
27. Id. at 31.
28. Id.
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which they can command a majority. 29 The 1931 redistricting plan passed by
the Minnesota Legislature-the subject of Smiley-was this type of plan.
Such a plan, taken to the extreme, can create a situation where both partisan
bias and responsiveness are high. Where a party has spread its supporters so
thinly that its electoral majorities are small, it may control a much higher
seat share than its vote share would indicate, but it may also be highly vul-
nerable to even small shifts in partisan preferences in the electorate. Part of
the challenge of a successful partisan gerrymander is striking this balance:
preserving as much partisan bias as possible while reducing responsiveness
as much as possible.0
At the time of Smiley, courts had not yet intervened to force parties to
create congressional districts of equal population,"' allowing parties much
greater ability to skew the electoral results than they possess today. Under
the plan at issue in Smiley, the Farmer-Labor-dominated Fifth District, cen-
tered around Minneapolis, was fifty-one percent larger in population than the
Republican-controlled First District in southem Minnesota.12 Taken to the ex-
treme, a plan with districts of varying populations could theoretically have
partisan bias so high and responsiveness so low that one party could receive
nearly all of the seat share regardless of its vote share. In practice, public opin-
ion exerts some limiting force on such excesses; in the Minnesota case, the
large size differentials between districts created public pressure against the
gerrymanderers even among their own partisans.33
B. Evaluating the Redistricting Process
This Section discusses how changes in redistricting processes affect re-
districting outcomes. Just as Section I.A argued that low partisan bias and
high responsiveness make a redistricting outcome desirable, a redistricting
process will be more desirable if it tends to produce such outcomes. This
evaluation is important in examining the context and effects of Smiley, be-
cause its primary holding dealt with the mechanism of redistricting and not
redistricting outcomes.34 The Court did not judge the Minnesota districting
29. Id. at 33.
30. Computers have recently made this task much easier. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267,
364 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The availability of enhanced computer technology allows the
parties to redraw boundaries in ways that target individual neighborhoods and homes, carving out
safe but slim victory margins in the maximum number of districts, with little risk of cutting their
margins too thin."). At the time of Smiley, gerrymanderers did not have machines to do their dirty
work for them.
31. Bruce E. Cain et al., From Equality to Fairness: The Path of Political Reform since Baker
v. Carr, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 6, 8
(Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005).
32. State ex rel. Smiley v. Holm, 238 N.W. 494,496 (Minn. 1931).
33. MAYER, supra note 4, at 71.
34. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 365 (1932) ("The question then is whether the provi-
sion of the Federal Constitution . .. invests the legislature with a particular authority ... the
definition of which imports a function different from that of lawgiver and thus renders inapplicable
the conditions which attach to the making of state laws.").
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plan by whether the substance of the plan was unconstitutional or otherwise
unlawful, but rather by whether the state legislature created it in a legally
permissible way. In doing so, the Court's decision had consequences for
both of the important variables in a state redistricting process: (1) the formal
decision-making structure and (2) the resulting plan should that structure
fail to produce a plan.
The first important variable in a redistricting process is the role of vari-
ous state actors, particularly the governor and the legislature, in the decision
making. As an official elected statewide, the governor's partisan alignment
will reflect that of the statewide electorate at the time of his last election.
Thus, if the relevant state and federal constitutional provisions require the
governor's signature before a redistricting plan can take effect, they add a
promajoritarian bias to the redistricting process-the seat share of the gov-
ernor's office is always 100% (there is only one governor), regardless of the
precise vote share the governor received. The involvement of the legislature
in the process, on the other hand, may introduce a countermajoritarian bias
into the plan. The legislature, composed of members elected from local dis-
tricts, may or may not reflect the partisan preferences of the statewide
electorate, depending on the distribution of partisan voters among the legis-
lative districts. Therefore, when the governor and legislature must undertake
redistricting together, one would expect the outcome to be at least as favor-
able to the party commanding majority support in the electorate as it would
be if the legislature were to undertake the process alone. If the redistricting
process excludes the governor and the state legislature redistricts without
her, however, one would expect to see a districting plan that reflects the par-
tisan alignment of the legislature.
Likewise, redistricting outcomes depend on the reversionary plan: the
plan that would take effect if the formal decision-making structure failed to
produce a plan. The reversionary plan would take effect, for example, if "the
governor and state legislature could not agree on a new plan."35 Reversionary
plans are defined by applicable state and federal law, and can be either con-
servative or radical.3 6 "When the current plan was also the reversionary plan
(or was the basis for that plan ... ), we say that the reversion was conserva-
tive."37 Otherwise, the plan is radical." In a situation where both parties have
power over the redistricting process, the party most likely to benefit from
the reversionary plan is also likely to do proportionately better in the bar-
gaining over redistricting.39 If a party expects to benefit from a court-ordered
plan in the absence of agreement, it has little incentive to agree to anything
less advantageous in negotiations with the opposing party.
35. Cox & KATZ, supra note 20, at 25.
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis in original).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 26.
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Finally, within any given redistricting process, the state of public opin-
ion constrains the actors. ° Where the party controlling the process expects
to receive a minority vote share in the next election, i.e., is the "weaker"
party,4' one would expect it to attempt to create districts that would increase
its partisan bias and reduce overall responsiveness. The "stronger" party will
tend to want greater short-term responsiveness. If the weaker and stronger
parties share the redistricting power, they must either reach a compromise or
accept the reversionary plan. The limit of public tolerance for unorthodox or
seemingly unfair plans also constrains political actors, as became evident in
the partisan sparring both before and after the Court's decision in Smiley.'
2
II. THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF SMILEY V HOLM
This Part explains the emergence of Smiley from the attempts of a falter-
ing ruling party to insulate its incumbents from predicted electoral defeat
and presents historical evidence to support this explanation. Section II.A
explains the partisan configuration of the state and its realignment away
from the Republican Party and toward the Farmer-Labor Party beginning
with the 1930 elections. Section 11.8 describes the Republican legislature's
attempt to minimize the responsiveness of the congressional elections and
maximize Republican partisan bias, at first through a political confrontation
with the governor and then by attempting to exclude him from the redistrict-
ing process entirely. Section II.C describes the litigation that resulted from
this standoff and discusses its outcome.
A. Setting the Stage for a Realignment: The Politics
of Minnesota Before 1931
Smiley arose at a time of political transition in Minnesota, as the new
Farmer-Labor Party challenged the long dominance of the Republican
Party.43 In the first decades of the twentieth century, economic changes in the
state began to create discontent with Republican rule."4 In response, agrarian
radicals from the Nonpartisan League 45 joined with third-party advocates
40. Id. at 32.
41. Id. at 35.
42. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 4, at 71; Editorial, The Gerrymander Made Easy, THE
MINNEAPOLIS TRIB., Nov. 11, 1932, at 13.
43. JENNIFER A. DELTON, MAKING MINNESOTA LIBERAL 2 (2002). The Democratic Party,
while present, was extremely weak, and was alternatively seen as "the party of treason" for its pro-
Southern stance during the Civil War and as a party "dominated by a despised Irish Catholic minor-
ity." Id.
44. Poor commodity prices led farmers to rally against "Twin City banks and terminal grain
elevators," MAYER, supra note 4, at 18, while urban areas saw an increase in radical labor organiz-
ing, RICHARD M. VALELLY, RADICALISM IN THE STATES: THE MINNESOTA FARMER-LABOR PARTY
AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 28 (1989).
45. The Nonpartisan League began in North Dakota in 1915 as an attempt by former North
Dakota Socialist Party activist Arthur Claude Townley to take over the state Republican Party from
within. VALELLY, supra note 44, at 17-18. It advocated "state ownership of terminal elevators, flour
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within the State Federation of Labor4 6 to form the Farmer-Labor Party.47 This
new party drew from "[t]wo major interests or sectors of the economy ....
One was the Midwest farmers' cooperative movement .... The other major
interest was the emerging organized labor movement in Minneapolis, St.
Paul, and the Iron Range .. . .,,4 During the 1920s, the Farmer-Labor Party
made modest gains in Minnesota, gradually increasing its vote and seat
shares in federal elections,49 but the Republican Party continued to dominate
state government and the state's congressional delegation. 0
In the elections of 1930, voters significantly changed the partisan compo-
sition of state government in the Farmer-Labor Party's favor.5 For the first
time, voters chose a Farmer-Labor candidate for governor. Farmer-Labor
gubernatorial candidate Floyd B. Olson won a massive 57.1% majority com-
pared to 35.0% for his Republican opponent, Ray Chase.12 Farmer-Laborites
and their allies also won approximately one-third of the seats in the state
legislature. 3 This shift put the new party in a position to challenge Republican
control over state policy, including redistricting.
The Republican leadership quickly solidified its control of the legisla-
ture and hence its control over the legislative agenda for the coming session.
Because Minnesota elected state legislators on a nonpartisan basis, party
leaders fought for control of each chamber by recruiting unaffiliated mem-
mills, packing houses, and cold-storage plants; state inspection of grain; exemption of farm im-
provements from taxation; state hail insurance on the basis of taxes paid on acreage; and rural credit
banks operated at cost." Id. at 18. In the elections of 1916, Nonpartisan League candidates won the
North Dakota governorship and the state House of Representatives. Id. at 20. In 1917, the League
moved its headquarters to St. Paul in an effort to expand its "'peaceful revolution by means of the
ballot.'" Id. at 20-21.
46. Between 1916 and 1919, about half of the state's industrial workforce became unionized,
and by 1919, major victories by labor-backed candidates around the state persuaded the Minnesota
State Federation of Labor to create an organization-the Working People's Nonpartisan Political
League-to parallel the Nonpartisan League. Id. at 34-35.
47. GIESKE, supra note 3, at 45.
48. Id. at vii.
49. Farmer-Laborite Henrik Shipstead won election to the U.S. Senate in 1922, and through-
out the 1920s voters elected a handful of Farmer-Laborites to the U.S. House of Representatives. Id.
at 141; MAYER, supra note 4, at 24.
50. GIESIE, supra note 3, at 119.
51. Three factors deserve credit for creating the environment for Farmer-Labor victory. First,
"[ilt was a depression year, without doubt an auspicious time for a party of protest." THEODORE C.
BLEGEN, MINNESOTA: A HISTORY OF THE STATE 522-23 (1975). Second, charismatic gubernatorial
candidate Floyd B. Olson assumed leadership of the party, moderating the party message while still
promising change in the economic system. MAYER, supra note 4, at 44. Third, the Democratic Party
chose not to contest the election, effectively supporting Olson. See GIESKE, supra note 3, at 140. The
Democrats' nominal candidate, Edward Indrehus, did not campaign and received only 3.5% of the
vote. Id. at 140, 162. After the election Olson appointed him to a position in the Rural Credit Bu-
reau. Id. at 162. By 1930, the Democrats had not won a statewide or congressional race since 1918,
when Carl C. Van Dyke was elected to Congress from the Fourth District. Id. at 47-48, 62-64, 75-
76, 91, 105-06, 119-21, 138-39; see also Congress Heavily Republican, Gains in Both Houses,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1920, at I (showing W.L. Carss, whom Gieske labeled a Democrat, winning as
an independent).
52. GIESKE, supra note 3, at 140.
53. Id. at 146.
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bers and moderates from other parties in an attempt to create a governing
majority.54 "Fearful that new members of doubtful affiliation would join the
Farmer Laborites to organize the house, [Republican leaders] called a cau-
cus for late November and dangled choice committee assignments before
them as bait."5 Attending the caucus meant supporting Republican leader-
ship of the chamber, and in all, 107 out of 131 members of the Minnesota
516House, including some Farmer-Laborites, attended. The Republicans then
completed their lock on the legislature by changing senate rules to strip the
Farmer-Labor lieutenant governor of his right to make senate committee
assignments and organizing the chamber themselves.
The 1931 legislative session, therefore, pitted a Republican-controlled
legislature against the state's first Farmer-Labor governor. 8 Understanding
the potential for stalemate, Governor Olson avoided major confrontations
with his opponents for most of the 1931 session, choosing moderate policy
goals and "avoid[ing] the aggressive tactics for which he became famous in
later years."5 9 However, in the closing days of the session, Olson clashed
with the Republicans over three major pieces of legislation, vetoing all of
them.60 The most contentious of these was the veto of a bill redrawing the
state's congressional districts.
B. The Republican Gerrymander: Fighting to Hold
Back the Realignment
In the conflict that led to Smiley, Republican legislative leaders attempted
to secure their hold over the congressional delegation by manipulating redis-
tricting outcomes and the redistricting process. They hoped to create districts
with minimal responsiveness and maximum partisan bias in their favor. The
Farmer-Labor Party hoped to put in place a system with promajoritarian parti-
san bias and high responsiveness, which would allow it to take full advantage
of its predicted strong support in the electorate. But uncertainty over the deci-
sion-making structure for redistricting, the reversionary plan that would
54. MAYER, supra note 4, at 58. Although parties could endorse and campaign for candi-
dates, ballots did not list the party affiliations of candidates for the state legislature. As a result,
voters elected many candidates without strong ties to any political party, and the leading factions
sought their allegiance in the period between the election and the convening of the legislature. Id.
("Uncertainty as to the political affiliations of legislators opened the way for all sorts of political
jobbery.").
55. Id. at 60.
56. Id.
57. GIEsia, supra note 3, at 145;MAYER, supra note 4, at 61.
58. GIESKE, supra note 3, at 145.
59. MAYER, supra note 4, at 67. In the subsequent session of the legislature in 1933, for
example, "(flour times he lashed his opponents mercilessly from the steps of the State Capitol,
where impoverished farmers and workers gathered to protest the postponement of relief legislation."
Id. at 120.
60. Id. at 70. In addition to the redistricting bill, Olson vetoed a metropolitan sewage dis-
posal bill because he considered the allocation of costs to be unfair, and he vetoed a bill regulating
trucking that he considered biased toward railroad interests. Id. at 71-76.
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obtain in the case of a failure to pass a redistricting bill, and the political
consequences of such a failure led each side to take actions that stymied the
legislative process and brought the two sides into court.
Politically, redistricting was more intractable than other policy issues
that divided Governor Olson and the legislature. First, the 1930 U.S. Census
reduced Minnesota's apportionment in the U.S. House of Representatives
from ten representatives to nine, forcing redistricting onto the state's agenda
by invalidating the old districts.6' Second, while the two sides had been able
to find mutually acceptable common ground on public works, securities
regulation, and conservation, redistricting was a zero-sum game: any seat
share gained by one party would be the other's loss.
Redistricting became a struggle over whether the new plan would allow
the Farmer-Labor Party to translate its predicted majority vote share into a
large seat share in the congressional delegation. The Republicans had much
to lose in this struggle. Despite the strong turnout for Olson, the Republican
Party had retained nine congressional seats in the 1930 election under the
contemporary state districting map.6 As Farmer-Labor support grew, these
seats began to look more and more precarious.
Uncertainty regarding the nature of the reversionary plan complicated
negotiations between the parties. Neither the latest federal reapportionment
act, passed in 1929, nor the previous act, passed in 1911, 6 ' addressed what
would happen in a state that lost representation and failed to redistrict. As
early as February 20, 1931, Senator William Petersen, chairman of the
Senate Reapportionment Committee, contacted Republican Attorney
General Henry Benson, asking what would be the result "[i]f we do not re-
district the state." 66 Benson, unable to answer, put the question to
Congressman Frank Clague in a letter, saying:
Various articles have appeared in the newspapers from time to time, and
expressions of opinion have been voiced as to the result in case the present
state legislature fails to redistrict the state. I am interested in knowing
whether a situation has ever arisen in congress where a state legislature
failed to redistrict the state. Was the state permitted to elect congressmen
as large .. . ? Was there ever a case where the state elected more represen-
61. State ex rel. Smiley v. Holm, 238 N.W. 494, 496 (Minn. 1931). While traditionally each
state redistricts after each decennial census, it was not required until the reapportionment revolution
of the 1960s. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); see also Cox & KATZ, supra note 20, at 12-
13. Nothing prohibits a state from redistricting more frequently, although such mid-decade redis-
tricting is rare. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
62. MAYER, supra note 4, at 67.
63. Farmer-Labor Congressman Paul Kvale won the remaining seat in an eighty-one percent
landslide in the Seventh District in western Minnesota. GIESKE, supra note 3, at 138.
64. Act of June 18, 1929, ch. 28, 46 Stat. 21 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2000)).
65. Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, 37 Stat. 13 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2000)).
66. Letter from Henry N. Benson, Att'y Gen., State of Minn., to William L. Petersen, Chair-
man of Senate Reapportionment Comm., State of Minn. (Mar. 4, 1931) (on file with the Law
Library of the Minnesota Attorney General).
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tatives in congress than were allowed it? And, if so, how did the house of
representatives dispose of the matter?67
William Tyler Page, clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, believed
that because the 1911 Act prescribed at-large elections for any new congres-
sional seats if a state gained representation and thereafter failed to• 68
redistrict, at-large election of the entire delegation should be the result in69
the event of a decrease 6-a radical reversionary plan. Page told Attorney
General Benson:
It has been many years since the representation of any state has been re-
duced. But in such case, by the same token as in the case of an increase,
failure to redistrict by the state legislature would result in all of the repre-
sentatives from such state being elected at large.0
One constituent proposed the novel solution of registering candidates in dis-
tricts one through nine and permitting residents of the Tenth District to vote
for any candidate in any of the first nine districts."'
Although both sides agreed that voters would respond badly if the state
failed to pass a plan during the legislature's regular session and that they
would also object to a special session, they disagreed about the political
consequences should a court deem at-large elections to be the reversionary
72plan. The Republicans seemed convinced that running candidates at large
would be unacceptable to voters. They were confident that Olson would not
risk this outcome, especially because they believed that a veto of a redistrict-
ing plan "would be interpreted as a 'defense of Minneapolis at the expense
of rural districts.' "7 Accordingly, they attempted to use the specter of at-
large elections to gain leverage against Olson.74 Olson, on the other hand,
appears to have understood that at-large elections would be unpopular,75 but
conventional wisdom held that such elections would work to the advantage
of his party. Given the geographic concentration of Farmer-Labor strength,
the promajoritarian partisan bias of at-large elections would allow the party
to take full advantage of its expected statewide majority vote share in a way
no feasible set of districts would. 76 Furthermore, while the Farmer-Labor
67. Letter from Henry N. Benson, Att'y Gen., State of Minn., to Frank Clague, U.S. Repre-
sentative, State of Minn. (Feb. 23, 1931) (on file with the Law Library of the Minnesota Attorney
General).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Letter from C.L. Strom to Floyd B. Olson, Governor, State of Minn. (received Apr. 14,
1932) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society, Minnesota State Archives, II .F. 18.2(F)).
72. Part III, infra, discusses the primary objections to at-large elections.
73. C.D. Johnston, Action to Force Olson's O.K. of New District Plan Caps House Vote, 81
to 42, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 19, 1931, at 1.
74. Id.
75. See Olson Vetoes Tri-Cities Sewage Bill, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 22, 1931, at 1.
76. Arthur Krock, Highest Court Voids State Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1932, at Al.
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Party was popular, its congressional candidates would lack the name recog-
nition and other advantages of incumbency enjoyed by the sitting
Republican congressmen in their districts. But outside of those districts, the
incumbents' reputations would count for much less, making them much
more vulnerable to a Farmer-Labor challenge based on issues of statewide
concern. One supporter advised Governor Olson:
It may be that it may look as if it will be harder for those of our boys who
have made up their minds to run for congress, but to my mind I think the
statewide proposition is an advantage. The Farmer-Labor men that will
loom up for it are quite well advertised over the state and will get their
share of support without a doubt. 7
These divergent political calculations led to legislative brinksmanship.
In their effort to exert maximum pressure on the governor, the Republicans
delayed serious consideration of any redistricting plan until the closing days
of the session. The conference committee dealing with reapportionment did
not meet with Governor Olson until April 15, 1931,71 seven days before the
legislature was to adjourn, not to meet again until 1933. 79 The conference
committee members presented a plan that attempted to shift the overall parti-
san bias of the congressional delegation in the Republicans' favor by
expanding the size of, and increasing the win margins in, Farmer-Labor
districts. It also attempted to insulate Republican incumbents and to reduce
the responsiveness of the system by drawing Farmer-Labor districts with sig-
nificantly greater populations than Republican districts and carving up the city
of Minneapolis, a Farmer-Labor stronghold.8° The Farmer-Labor Leader
complained that the Republican "scheme was to enlarge the Seventh Con-
gressional District now represented by [Farmer-Labor member] Paul John
Kvale so as to include a large percentage of the Farmer-Labor vote of the
state and thereby eliminate this vote from having an influence in determin-
ing the election outcome in other congressional districts."'" Likewise, it
argued that "the legislature proceeded to shape up districts in such a manner
5, 2
as to make the present congressmen safe, if possible."
77. Letter from Thomas Vollom, Justice of the Peace, Erskine, Minn., to Floyd B. Olson,
Governor, State of Minn. (Apr. 15, 1932) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society,
111 .F. 18.2(F)).
78. Olson to Offer Reapportioning Proposal Today, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 16, 1931,
at 1.
79. See MINN. J. OF THE HOUSE, 1931, at 1582 (recording the adjournment of the House sine
die on April 22, 1931).
80. MAYER, supra note 4, at 70; Roger V. Shumate, Minnesota's Congressional Election At
Large, 27 AM. POL. SC. REV. 58, 58 (1933) ("There can be little question that the bill was a gerry-
mander.... The obvious purpose was to increase the representation of the rural part of the state over
that of the urban, and to favor the Republican party at the expense of the Farmer-Labor party.").
81. Governor Floyd B. Olsen Vetoes Iniquitous Scheme For Redistricting State, FARMER-
LABOR LEADER (St. Paul, Minn.), Apr. 30, 1931, at 3.
82. Henry G. Teigan, Governor Floyd B. Olson Vetoes Three Proposals: Redistricting,
Drainage and So-Called Truck Bill, FARMER-LABOR LEADER (St. Paul, Minn.), Apr. 30, 1931, at 1.
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Olson understood that the Republicans had reached too far, proposing
districts so gerrymandered that he could reject the plan with public support
and without facing criticism for unseemly partisanship. Rebuffing the mem-
bers of the conference committee, Olson told them that "he favored
redistricting on a basis which will make each district as nearly equal in pop-
ulation as possible. 8 3 He responded the next day with an entirely new map,
one that moved several wards of Minneapolis into the Third Congressional
District, displacing two counties into the Republican First. Although the
Pioneer Press called the plan "a gerrymander of Minneapolis,"85 the districts
in the governor's plan were significantly more equal in population than in
the Republican plan and crossed no county lines outside of Hennepin
County, which was too large for one district.1
6
The Republican leadership rejected the governor's counteroffer and sent
its own plan to the House and Senate for final passage on April 17. With only
days left in the legislative session, a revised conference report passed the
House with eighty-one votes.88 The Senate passed the measure the following
Monday, the third-to-last day of the session.' 9 Although this plan differed
slightly from the original Republican plan by moving one Minneapolis ward,
it still drew districts with a strong pro-Republican partisan bias and minimal
responsiveness. George Mayer notes that it:
deprived Minneapolis of one of her two congressmen, and dumped her
heavily Farmer Laborite Third and Tenth wards into the Seventh District,
which habitually elected third-party congressmen. This unblushing gerry-
mander made the Seventh District so large that it stretched from the
Dakota border to the heart of Minneapolis. 90
The Republicans still believed that if the legislature passed a redistrict-
ing bill, public opposition to at-large elections would force the governor to
sign it. Under the subheading "Representatives Dare [Governor] to Allow
Nine Candidates to Run at Large," the Pioneer Press described the Republi-
can strategy: "Hold up final reapportionment until the last day of the session
with the belief that the Governor will not dare to veto a Conservative faction
plan and force all Congressmen to run at large."9' The paper's editorial
board agreed with this assessment, saying "no plan that conceivably may be
drafted can possibly be so bad as no plan at all."92 If the governor did veto
83. Olson to Offer Reapportioning Proposal Today, supra note 78.
84. Olson and Arens Disparity Noted in Redistricting, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, Apr. 17,
1931, at 2.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Reapportionment Report Rejected, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, Apr. 18, 1931, at l.
88. Johnston, supra note 73.
89. Id.; Olson Vetoes District Plan, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 21, 1931, at 1.
90. MAYER, supra note 4, at 70.
91. Johnston, supra note 73.
92. Editorial, Down the Home Stretch, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 20, 1931, at 6.
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the redistricting bill, the Republicans believed that "they would then be in
position to demand that he call a special session to dispose of this legisla-
tion."93
Defying expectations, Olson vetoed the bill the same day that the Senate
passed it.94 At-large elections would work to the advantage of his party, so
long as the public blamed the legislature for causing them. In his veto mes-
sage, he declared, "The State of Minnesota must be redistricted, but that
redistricting should be based upon a fair division of population.... To avoid
the confusion of having candidates for Congress from Minnesota running at
large I earnestly urge you to work out an equitable plan of reapportion-
ment."95 Then, in a separate statement the same day, Olson also restated his
refusal to call a special session, saying, "There is no reason why the present
Legislature cannot solve the major problems before it at tonight's session. If
the Legislature cannot solve them at this session, there is no encouragement
for the hope that it may solve them at any special session. 96 He then restated
his demands on redistricting:
I have pointed out that the Legislature must take into consideration a divi-
sion of districts fair to the entire State. If this Legislature fails to pass a
new reapportionment bill, the question of Congressional redistricting is a
matter for the courts to decide. If the Congressmen of Minnesota are
forced to run at large, the blame lies entirely with a group within the Legis-
97lature which blocked fair reapportionment measures.
As Olson hoped, the public held the legislature responsible for the im-
passe. Mayer reports that "[t]he veto won unanimous approval in urban
districts and even received some support in southern Minnesota, which
stood to profit by the [vetoed] reapportionment" plan. The Pioneer Press
editorial page blamed the situation on the fact that "the Legislature would
rather play politics than heed the warning of Governor Olson as to the kind
of redistricting measure he would approve."99 However, the paper still pre-
sented at-large elections as a worst-case scenario, saying "in that event there
will be no local representation at all, only representation of the State as a
whole. Districts which are complaining about trifling changes should con-
sider whether they would like such an alternative any better."' °
93. Johnston, supra note 73.
94. MINN. J. OFTHE HOUSE, 1931, at 1448-49.
95. Letter from Floyd B. Olson, Governor, State of Minn., to Oscar A. Swenson, Speaker of
the House of Representatives, State of Minn. (Apr. 20, 1931) in MINN. J. OF THE HoUSE, 1931, at
1448-49.
96. Olson Vetoes Tri-Cities Sewage Bill, supra note 75.
97. Id.
98. MAYER, supra note 4, at 71. Southern Minnesota tended to support Republican candi-
dates, and the legislature's redistricting plan created smaller districts in that part of the state.
99. Editorial, While the State Waits, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 21, 1931, at 7.
100. Id.
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But rather than revise their plan, the Republicans responded with a novel
attempt to change the redistricting process by removing the governor from
the process entirely. On the same day as the veto, "Senator A.J. Rockne of
Zumbrota branded the veto as 'ineffective,' "because "[t]he Federal Consti-
tution does not require that the redistricting should be done through any
other source than by the Legislature and does not provide that the Governor
have anything to do with the matter.'' This argument would form the basis
of the legislature's position in Smiley. In the final hours of the session, the
House of Representatives adopted this position, passing a resolution, moved
by Representative Rodenberg, directing the Republican Secretary of State,
Mike Holm, to record the redistricting plan without the governor's signa-
ture. 0 2 It declared,
Whereas, on the 18th day of April, 1931, the House of Representatives of
the State of Minnesota duly passed H. F No. 1456, a bill for an act to di-
vide the State of Minnesota into nine Congressional Districts; and
Whereas, on the 20th day of April, 1931, said H. F. No. 1456 was duly
passed by the Senate of the State of Minnesota...
Now, Therefore, Be It Resolved, That the Chief Clerk of the House be and
he is hereby directed to deposit for filing with the Secretary of State the
enrolled copy of said H. F. No. 1456, said bill to become and remain part
of the permanent records of the office of the Secretary of State.'°3
The motion passed sixty-three to thirty-four, '4 with many members not vot-
ing. 105
C. The Litigation and Its Outcome
Legal action began almost immediately after the legislature adjourned.
The dispute centered around two essential questions: (1) What was the re-
districting process? Did the governor have the authority to veto the
redistricting plan, thereby preventing it from taking effect, or did the legisla-
ture have the authority to act independently under a direct delegation of
power from the U.S. Constitution? (2) What was the reversionary plan?
Would at-large elections be the result if the redistricting plan was not in ef-
fect? The U.S. Supreme Court took the pro-Farmer-Labor position on both
questions, confirming the governor's role in the redistricting process and
establishing at-large elections as the reversionary plan.'06
101. Olson Vetoes District Plan, supra note 89.
102. H.R. Res., 47th Legis. Sess. (Minn. 1931) in MINN. J. OF THE HOUSE, 1931, at 1581.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See MAYER, supra note 4, at 60 (indicating that there were 131 members of the House at
the time).
106. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
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Following the adjournment of the legislature, Secretary of State Mike
Holm abided by the order of the legislature and began implementing the
vetoed plan, accepting filings from candidates to run in each of the nine new
congressional districts, while refusing to accept filings for candidates wish-
ing to run at large.' °7 One of the refused candidates, Emil Holmes of
Hennepin County, quickly secured a district court order requiring Holm "to
show cause ... why he should not accept and file" Holmes's affidavit for
election to the office of congressman at large. 0 At the same time, W. Yale
Smiley, an attorney from Minneapolis, was seeking an injunction to prevent
Holm from accepting filings for election to represent any congressional dis-
trict. 09
Both Holm and Smiley turned to Republican Attorney General Henry
Benson for assistance. Holm notified Benson of the order from the Hennepin
County district court"0 and sought advice on the legal status of the legisla-
ture's redistricting act."' Benson gave him little help, responding:
You ask first whether you should file [the vetoed plan].... [I]n our opin-
ion, it is proper that it be filed in your office.
You next ask if it should be given a chapter number and made a part of the
laws of 1931. In our opinion it should not. In the absence of the approval
of the governor, or passage over his veto as provided by the constitution, it
is not a law of the state. Its status can be only that of a joint resolution of
the two houses of the legislature.
This opinion is confined to the specific questions asked by you, and we
express no opinion as to the validity or effect of this measure. " '
Benson was even more dismissive of Smiley. Smiley had asked Benson to:
[R]equest of the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, a writ directed
to Mike Holm, Secretary of State, commanding him to return any and all
filings for the office of congressman which designate a congressional dis-
trict [and] enjoining him from receiving any filings for the office of
congressman which designate a congressional district."'
Benson responded that his job was to represent the state-and therefore
Holm-in this matter, and that the law furnished Smiley "ample authority
107. Petition T 54-55, State ex rel Smiley v. Holm (Minn. Dist. Ct., May 4, 1931) (on file
with the Minnesota Historical Society, Governor, Miscellaneous Records 110.1. 17.4F Box 1).
108. Letter from Henry N. Benson, Att'y Gen., State of Minn., to W. Yale Smiley, Att'y at
Law (Apr. 29, 1931) (on file with the Law Library of the Minnesota Attorney General).
109. Petition, supra note 107, IN 68-70.
110. Letter from Henry N. Benson to W. Yale Smiley, supra note 108.
111. Letter from Henry N. Benson, Att'y Gen., State of Minn., to Mike Holm, Sec'y of State,
State of Minn. (Apr. 29, 1931) (on file with the Law Library of the Minnesota Attorney General).
112. Id.
113. Letter from Henry N. Benson to W. Yale Smiley, supra note 108.
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... to present the question referred to in [his] letter either to the supreme
court or the district court.""
4
Smiley sued for an injunction in Ramsey County District Court before
Judge Gustavus Loevinger. He argued that the governor was appropriately
involved in the decision-making process of redistricting, and the redistrict-
ing bill had not come into effect due to the governor's veto."5 He cited the
Minnesota Constitution, which states "Every order, resolution, or vote re-
quiring the concurrence of the two houses ... shall be presented to the
Governor for his signature and before the same shall take effect shall be ap-
proved by him .... The state district court held in favor of Holm, and
Smiley appealed to the state supreme court."
7
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision,
adopting the Republican position that the U.S. Constitution gave the power
to redistrict to the legislature alone, and therefore the governor's veto was a
nullity and the redistricting plan was effective. The court noted that when
ratifying constitutional amendments, the state legislature was not required to
submit its opinion to the governor."' In these situations it "does not act in
the discharge of its legislative duties as the lawmaking body, but does act for
and in behalf of and as representative of the people of the state, under the
power conferred by .. . the Federal Constitution."" 9 Just as in the amend-
ment process, the court said, in the redistricting process under Article I,
Section 4 "[t]he Governor's veto has no relation to such matters; that power
pertains, under the state Constitution, exclusively to state affairs."' 20 The
court also dismissed the plaintiffs' observation that reapportionment had
always previously been submitted to the governor for his signature or veto,
saying "since the matter here involved arises out of the Federal Constitution
and its meaning is so clear ... there is no room for the application of the
doctrine of practical construction."
2
'
Reaction to the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling was muted. The fol-
lowing day's Pioneer Press noted that "State officials, including Governor
114. Id.
115. Petition, supra note 107, in 61-62. Smiley also argued that even had the bill not been
voided by the veto, it must be invalid because it violated the provisions of the 1911 Reapportion-
ment Act requiring that districts be composed of compact territory and contain approximately an
equal number of people. Id. U1[ 58-60, 65-66. The Minnesota Supreme Court responded that the
1911 Reapportionment Act, with its requirements of compactness, contiguity, and equal population,
had been "replaced by subsequent law" (i.e., the 1929 Reapportionment Act) and "was no longer
upon the scene." State ex rel. Smiley v. Holm, 238 N.W. 494, 497 (1931). The U.S. Supreme Court
declined to address this issue. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 375 (1932).
116. Petition, supra note 107, 47.
117. Smiley, 238 N.W. at 496. The opinion of the state district court was not published in a
reporter.
118. See id. at 499.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 500. Although Black's defines "practical construction" as "[a]n interpretation given
at or near the time when a writing was prepared," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (8th ed. 2004), the
court seems to use the term to mean construction in accord with established practice.
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Olson, declined ... to comment."'2 2 It also relayed the opinions of Smiley,
Republican Congressman W.I. Nolan of Minneapolis, and State Representa-
tive John Weeks, one of the attorneys for the petitioners, that a U.S.
Supreme Court decision would ultimately be required to lay the matter to
rest. 23 Nevertheless, the paper's editorial page expressed great relief that
what it had previously termed the "Reapportionment Chaos"' 2 4 was at an
end. It declared the Court's decision "welcome throughout the greater part
of Minnesota" and declared that "[t]he law and public convenience fortu-
nately coincide."'' 25 Under a contrary ruling, the paper declared, "a condition
of great confusion would exist, and a special session of the Legislature
would probably be unavoidable."' 2 6 There can be no doubt that Governor
Olson and his partisans did not feel the same sense of relief, and Smiley
appealed his case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court in an
8-0 decision.1 7 Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, concluded that be-
cause redistricting is lawmaking (in a way that ratifying constitutional
amendments is not), the legislature must act through the normal legislative
channels provided in its state constitution, namely subject to gubernatorial
veto. The Court then determined that in the absence of a valid districting
plan, a state must elect its congressmen at large to prevent the state from
being left without representation entirely. 29Yet rather than grounding its
holding in any statute, the Court presented the remedy of at-large elections
as the necessary consequence of constitutional structure:
Where, as in the case of Minnesota, the number of representatives has been
decreased ... existing districts are not at all adapted to the new apportion-
ment. It follows that in such a case, unless and until new districts are
created, all representatives allotted to the State must be elected by the State
at large. That would be required, in the absence of a redistricting act, in or-
der to afford the representation to which the State is constitutionally
entitled, and the general provisions of the Act of 1911 cannot be regarded
as intended to have a different import."O
Following the ruling in Smiley, the Court made summary decisions in
two companion cases, ordering at-large elections in New York and Missouri,
122. State Officials Silent on Court Districting O.K., ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 10, 1931,
at 2.
123. Id.
124. Editorial, Reapportionment Chaos, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 24, 1931, at 8.
125. Editorial, The Districts Stand, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 10, 1931, at 5.
126. Id.
127. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). Justice Cardozo recused himself because he had
rendered a decision on one of the companion cases. Krock, supra note 76.
128. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 367-68.
129. Id. at 374-75.
130. Id.
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both states in which the legislature had similarly refused to recognize the
governor's ability to veto redistricting legislation.'3
Immediately after the ruling in Smiley, many commentators argued that
because no state law authorized at-large elections, Minnesota could not pro-
ceed without a special session of the legislature to pass one. While Congress
had authorized states to conduct at-large elections in certain circumstances
in the past, no congressional statute provided for at-large elections in
Minnesota in 1932. Furthermore, Minnesota had no state election law to
govern such a contest. Before the Court handed down its decision in Smiley,
the Pioneer Press noted that "[t]here is also an opinion that no legal author-
ity exists for [at-large congressional elections] .... If that is true, the only
solution ... would be to elect ten congressmen [from the old districts] and
let the House of Representatives seat nine of them."13 3 Indeed, the Attorney
General seemed convinced that this was the case. Before the litigation be-
gan, he had told Senator William L. Petersen, the chairman of the Senate
Reapportionment Committee, "[W]e have no law which authorizes the elec-
tion of representatives in congress at large, and it is doubtful whether the
secretary of state would be authorized to receive filings for congress for
election at large.' 34 Even after the Supreme Court ruling, Benson continued
to claim that as long as "there is no state machinery for congressional can-
didates to run at large," Secretary of State Holm could not accept such
filings.135 This confusion left the papers discussing a wide variety of options,
including the option favored by the Pioneer Press: that Congress itself in-
tervene and draw districts for Minnesota.116 Some proposed that if Congress
were to do so, Minnesota could hold a special election early in 1933 after
the legislature convened and Governor Olson and the Republicans reached a
compromise. 
37
In the end, however, the Supreme Court decision proved the final battle
in securing at-large elections for the 1932 congressional contest. Holm ac-
cepted petitions for candidates running at large. Each party held a
statewide primary, where each voter chose her top nine candidates. The top
nine vote-getters from each party then advanced to the general election,
where again each voter chose her top nine candidates for the nine seats.
131. Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380, 382 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375, 379 (1932).
See generally Harold M. Bowman, Congressional Redistricting and the Constitution, 31 MICH. L.
REV. 149 (1932) (discussing the consequences of the decision in Smiley).
132. Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, 37 Stat. 13 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2000)).
133. Editorial, supra note 124.
134. Letter from Henry N. Benson to William L. Petersen, supra note 66.
135. C.D. Johnston, Olson Restates Refusal to Call Special Session, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Apr. 12, 1932, at 1.
136. Editorial, Confusion Worse Confounded, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 12, 1932, at 5.
137. E.g., Letter from Arthur N. Jacobs to Floyd B. Olson, Governor, State of Minn. (Jan. 13,
1932) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society, Minnesota State Archives, Gov. Olson's Ad-
min. 111.F.18.2(F)).
138. Neither Benson nor anyone else appears to have challenged Holm's acceptance of at-
large candidacies in court.
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Those candidates with the highest statewide totals became the Minnesota
congressional delegation.
III. EVALUATING THE REMEDY: THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THE AT-LARGE ELECTIONS
This Part examines the effect of the Court's decision to order at-large
elections and concludes that the judgment blocked the gerrymandering
party's countermajoritarian maneuvers, without producing some of the nega-
tive consequences usually ascribed to at-large elections. 39 Section III.A
compares the responsiveness demonstrated by the at-large system and the
partisan bias of the results with the responsiveness and partisan bias of the
vetoed districting plan. It also investigates the effect of the decision on sub-
sequent redistricting outcomes. It shows that in both the 1932 elections and
• • • 140
in the subsequent redistricting, the decision of the Court effectively de-
feated the countermajoritarian efforts of the Republican Party, while
political factors prevented dramatic promajoritarian partisan bias-a major
concern associated with at-large elections. Section III.B considers two other
major concerns frequently expressed about at-large elections and concludes
that in this case, concerns that the process would create voter confusion
proved unfounded but that the results bore out concerns about underrepre-
sentation of small sectional interests.
A. Consequences for Substantive Representation
This Section demonstrates that Smiley limited the negative consequences
of partisan gerrymanders in two ways. First, Section III.A. 1 argues that it
created a redistricting outcome that replaced the predicted low responsive-
ness and high partisan bias of the Republican plan with an at-large system
that generated little partisan bias and high responsiveness. This outcome
allowed the Farmer-Labor Party to swiftly express the state's new partisan
alignment in Congress. Moreover, the elections demonstrated little of the
underrepresentation of minority parties that many courts expect to result
from at-large elections. Second, Section III.A.2 argues that Smiley limited
countermajoritarian partisan gerrymandering in future elections by changing
the redistricting process: Smiley confirmed the availability of the gubernato-
rial veto and established at-large elections as the reversionary outcome. At
the same time, political factors limited the potential for promajoritarian ger-
rymandering.
139. E.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977) ("[T]he practice of multimember dis-
tricting can contribute to voter confusion [see infra Section III.B.l], make legislative representatives
more remote from their constituents [see infra Section I.B.2], and tend to submerge electoral mi-
norities and overrepresent electoral majorities [see infra Section mII.A].").
140. The state senate was not up for election in 1932, so it was still under Republican control.
MAYER, supra note 4, at 117. Farmer-Laborites had captured a plurality of the seats in the state
house of representatives, and they crafted a governing coalition that included a group of Democrats
and progressive Republicans. GIESKE, supra note 3, at 169.
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1. Redistricting Outcomes: The 1932 Congressional Elections
Smiley replaced a Republican plan designed for high prominority parti-
san bias and low responsiveness with an at-large system that demonstrated
low promajoritarian partisan bias and high responsiveness. Section III.A. l.a
explains the opinions of commentators who universally predicted a much
higher level of promajoritarian partisan bias. Section III.A.1.b discusses the
actual results of the election, arguing that the actual partisan bias was lower
than expected because voters chose individual candidates rather than party
slates.
a. The Predicted Results: High Responsiveness, High Partisan Bias
At-large elections seemed destined to create massive partisan bias 4' in
favor of the majority party, expected to be the Farmer-Labor Party. In an at-
large system in a three-way race where all voters vote a straight party ticket,
a party garnering only 34% of the vote could win 100% of the seat share, for
a partisan bias of 66%. Likewise, an at-large system has the ability to dem-
onstrate dramatic responsiveness: theoretically, given straight ticket voting
in a three-party system, a party with a 33% vote share and a 0% seat share
could gain 100% seat share while gaining only 1% additional vote share.
Commentators all believed that the partisan bias and responsiveness of
the system would benefit the governor's party. The New York Times noted
that "[i]n an at large election ... the Governor's party-the Farmer-Labor-
is expected here to elect six or seven of its nominees."' 2 The Pioneer Press
went even further, predicting "either a clean sweep ... or at least heavy in-
roads." 43 A supporter who sent Governor Olson a hand-scrawled letter
agreed, saying, "I for my part and many with me is [sic] opposed to an extra
session this time .... If elected at large we Farmer Labor may gain by it."'"
Commentators generally accepted this Farmer-Labor advantage, how-
ever, as the just desserts of the gerrymandering Republicans in the
legislature. The Minneapolis Tribune declared that it was "poetic justice" for
the Republican Party and "[t]he Penalty for Gerrymandering.' ' 145 One con-
stituent wrote, "these birds that build their nest for personal gain should be
forced to sit in it.' ,146 Another wrote, "[t]hey mixed their medicine, let them
141. See supro text accompanying note 18.
142. Krock, supra note 76.
143. Alfred D. Stedman, Solons Talk of Union for Race at Large, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Apr. 12, 1932, at 1.
144. Letter from John C. Sjolander to Floyd B. Olson, Governor, State of Minn. (Apr. 18,
1932) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society, Minnesota State Archives, Gov. Olson's Ad-
min. I Ii.F.18.2(F)).
145. Editorial, The Penalty for Gerrymandering, MINNEAPOLIS TRIB., Apr. 13, 1932, at 6.
146. Letter from G.S. Walker to Floyd B. Olson, Govemor, State of Minn. (Apr. 19, 1932) (on
file with the Minnesota Historical Society, Minnesota State Archives, Gov. Olson's Admin.
11 .F.18.2(F)).
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take it.' 47 A third, who demonstrated a keen and heartfelt sense of the im-
portance of responsiveness in elections, declared that the legislative
leadership
had the opportunity at the previous session to straighten out that thing and
they deliberately refused to do it, thinking that they would get you in a
hole.... [L]et the Minnesota delegation in Congress be turned loose and
let the whole State shoot at them once and they won't feel so cocky.,
48
The Farmer-Labor Party explicitly sought to use the new system to its
advantage. Under the title "Now For a Clean Sweep!" the Fanner-Labor
Leader called upon its readers and candidates to "go down the line for each
other and for the ticket as a whole."'4 9 Such party discipline was required,
the newspaper explained, "[t]o counteract the influence of the Republican
press and also of the money bags, which are always made available to the
Republicans."'50 Days before the election, the paper put it even more bluntly,
saying "In voting for the candidates of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor party it
is not necessary that you familiarize yourself with all the names of the can-
didates. The thing to keep in mind is that the candidates of the Minnesota
Farmer-Labor Party are so designated on the ballot."'
5
'1
b. The Results of the 1932 Elections: Low Promajoritarian
Bias and High Responsiveness
Expectations of high partisan bias were not borne out by the election re-
sults. The at-large elections that were the redistricting outcome created by
Smiley resulted in heightened responsiveness, but only a small amount of
promajoritarian bias. The elections, therefore, allowed the changing prefer-
ences of the Minnesota electorate to sweep the former ruling party and its
standard-bearers from power without severely overrepresenting the new rul-
ing party.
When all votes were in, the results showed only minor partisan bias
compared to the highest possible bias of 66%. The Farmer-Labor Party gar-
nered 38% of the popular vote and 56% of the seat share, ' for a partisan
bias of 18%. The Republicans suffered a negative partisan bias, but only
147. Letter from George F. Gage to Floyd B. Olson, Governor, State of Minn. (Apr. 13, 1932)
(on file with the Minnesota Historical Society, Minnesota State Archives, Gov. Olson's Admin.
Ill .F. 18.2(F)).
148. Letter from A.U. Ricke to Floyd B. Olson, Governor, State of Minn. (Apr. 13, 1932) (on
file with the Minnesota Historical Society, Minnesota State Archives, Gov. Olson's Admin.
Ill .F. 18.2(F)).
149. Editorial, Now For a Clean Sweep!, FARMER-LABOR LEADER (St. Paul, Minn.), June 30,
1932, at 4.
150. Id.
151. Editorial, Vote Minnesota F-L "Straight", FARMER-LABOR LEADER (St. Paul, Minn.),
Oct. 30, 1932, at 4.
152. See 1932 Election Results, supra note 9 (providing raw data from 1932 elections).
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slightly, winning a vote share of 36% and a seat share of 33%. 13 The
Democrats suffered the greatest negative partisan bias, winning a vote share
of 25% but a seat share of only 11%.114 To the extent that the Democratic
and Farmer-Labor Parties functioned as a coalition on the federal level,' 55
the partisan bias of the at-large elections vanished almost entirely: together
they received 64% of the vote and 67% of the seats. 5 6 One cannot determine
precisely what the vote and seat shares might have been had the state en-
acted the Republican districting plan. But assuming similar vote shares and
that the Republicans would have succeeded in preserving a majority of seats
for their partisans, the partisan bias would have been worse than under the
at-large system.
In this case, split-ticket voting prevented the winner-take-all result one
might fear from at-large elections. 5 7 Had voters not split their tickets, but
cast all of their votes for one party, one party would have received 100% of
the seats. So although the Farmer-Labor Party won 38% of total votes cast
for all candidates, it did not get all of the votes of 38% of the people, but
rather less than all of the votes from more than 38% of the voters. This re-
sult seems to indicate that voters possessed a desire, despite the prodding of
the Farmer-Labor Party, to get to know the candidates and vote for them as
individuals. This characteristic mitigated the threat of promajoritarian parti-
san bias.
The elections also showed impressive responsiveness. The Farmer-Labor
Party's vote share increased only 2.1%, from 35.7% in 1930 to 37.8% in
1932, but its seat share increased from only 10% to a majority of 56% .
The Republicans, by contrast, suffered an 18.6% decline in their vote share
and a corresponding 57% drop in their seat share.' 9 The Democrats' vote
share rose by 16.4% and their seat share rose by 11%. '60
Incumbents proved extremely vulnerable in the at-large elections. Voterse 161
returned only two out of the ten incumbent congressmen to office. Of the
153. See id. (providing raw data from 1932 elections).
154. See id. (providing raw data from 1932 elections).
155. See Krock, supra note 76 ("The... at-large Congressional elections may also be respon-
sible for giving the Democrats a working majority in the next Congress because of the expected
victory of so many Farmer-Laborites in Minnesota."). For more about the relationship between the
Farmer-Labor Party and Roosevelt in 1932, see GIESKE, supra note 3, at 160-62. For a discussion of
the relationship between New Deal policy and Farmer-Labor Party fortunes, see VALELLY. supra
note 44, at 83-118.
156. See 1932 Election Results, supra note 9 (providing raw data from 1932 elections).
157. Shumate, supra note 80, at 61 ("That many split ballots were cast is made evident by
comparing the votes of some of the candidates.").
158. See 1932 Election Results, supra note 9 (providing raw data from 1932 elections); 1930
Election Results, supra note 9 (providing raw data from 1930 elections).
159. See 1932 Election Results, supra note 9 (providing raw data from 1932 elections); 1930
Election Results, supra note 9 (providing raw data from 1930 elections).
160. See 1932 Election Results, supra note 9 (providing raw data from 1932 elections); 1930
Election Results, supra note 9 (providing raw data from 1930 elections).
161. See 1932 Election Results, supra note 9;1930 Election Results, supra note 9.
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nine incumbent Republican congressmen, voters returned only one to of-
fice. 162 These losses are due in large part simply to the partisan affiliation of
the incumbents. But they likely also resulted from the fact that while many
of the incumbents had developed reputations only in their own districts, sev-
eral of the candidates in the at-large elections had, or were able to develop,
strong statewide reputations.164
2. Redistricting Processes: Bargaining over Future Redistricting
The Supreme Court's imposition of at-large elections was not just im-
portant in 1932; it had a lasting impact on redistricting that likely stretched
beyond Minnesota. By imposing a radical reversionary outcome and ensur-
ing the governor's role in the process, the Supreme Court made structural
changes to the redistricting process that shifted bargaining over redistricting
in a promajoritarian direction. However, political factors limited the ability
of any single party to exploit these structural advantages. Forced to negoti-
ate with the governor and faced with the prospect of another at-large
election, the Republicans readily accepted a Farmer-Labor redistricting
plan. But public opposition to gerrymandering and at-large elections pre-
vented the governor from insisting on a plan that could deliver to his party
the benefits that otherwise would have been available given his strong nego-
tiating position.
The Supreme Court infused a promajoritarian bias into the redistricting
process in two ways. First, it confirmed the governor's role within the proc-
ess. 16 Because the governor is elected statewide, he directly reflects the
preferences of the majority of the state's citizens in a way that the legislature
may not. Without the involvement of Governor Olson, the legislature would
have simply enacted the gerrymandered plan it had passed. The very point
of this plan was to preserve Republican majority in the congressional dele-
gation despite an expected loss of the popular vote, an outcome that would
rely on high partisan bias and a minimal level of responsiveness.
Second, the Court infused majoritarianism into the redistricting process
by establishing at-large elections as the reversionary outcome that would
take effect when a state had no valid districting plan. 66 Barring other con-
siderations, once all parties understood that at-large elections would be the
default, the party expecting to receive the majority support in the electorate
would have no incentive to accept a redistricting plan that would give it less
seat share than it would expect in an at-large election. When the Minnesota
Legislature reconvened in 1933, the prospect that another deadlock would
162. See 1932 Election Results, supra note 9; 1930 Election Results, supra note 9.
163. Shumate, supra note 80, at 62.
164. Id.
165. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 373 (1932).
166. Id. at 374-75. At-large elections are no longer the reversionary plan. Today, courts sup-
ply districts when the political process fails to draw them. See, e.g., Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254,
269-72 (2003).
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lead to the repetition of at-large elections ensured Olson a much stronger
bargaining position. The Republicans "disliked the Farmer Labor version of
congressional reapportionment but accepted it rather than face another elec-
tion of representatives at large.
'
"1 67
As with at-large elections themselves, elections conducted with districts
created with at-large elections as the reversionary plan leave open the possi-
bility of promajority partisan bias. However, a redistricting process with
gubernatorial involvement and at-large elections as the reversionary out-
come would have long-term responsiveness. A new party gaining majority
support in the electorate would be able to capture the governor's office, and
from there bargain for districts reflective of its strength. It would bargain
from a strong position, knowing it could always default to at-large elections,
where it would do well.
By contrast, the Court could have determined that until a state govern-
ment agrees on how to elect its congressmen, it simply is without
representation in Congress. Such a "no representation" reversionary out-
come would have radically and antidemocratically reshaped the bargaining
process over redistricting. Almost certainly, the prospect of such an outcome
would have been extremely unpopular politically, compelling Governor
Olson to call a special session of the legislature and reenter negotiations
with the Republicans. Because either party would have the power to stymie
the redistricting process, either could theoretically have resisted any plan
that would tip the partisan balance of the congressional delegation to the
other party. This incentive to hold out would tend to drive the bargaining
process toward a plan allocating power equally between the two parties,
regardless of their vote shares. Such a plan would contain a partisan bias in
favor of the "weaker" party and would be calculated to minimize respon-
siveness, weakening the ability of voters to toss out one party en masse and
replace it with the other.
Yet, despite the fact that the Farmer-Labor Party was able to enact the
redistricting plan it proposed, the plan failed to deliver any promajoritarian
benefits to the Farmer-Labor Party. When the congressional seats came up
for election again in 1934, the party again won the most votes, but the plan
left the Farmer-Labor vote heavily concentrated in the Third, Seventh, and
Ninth Congressional Districts, whereas the Republican vote was more widely
dispersed."" The Republicans received 37% of the statewide vote, while the
Farmer-Labor Party received a plurality of 37.9%,69 yet the Republicans took
five of the nine congressional seats and the Farmer-Labor Party took
only three. 7
167. MAYER, supra note 4, at 139; see also HF. 722, 1933 Minn. Leg., Reg. Sess. (providing
the final reapportionment of Minnesota into nine Congressional districts).
168. See STATE CANVASSING 13D., MINN. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, GENERAL ELEC-
TION REPORT (1934) [hereinafter 1934 Election Results] (providing raw data from 1934 elections).
169. See id. (providing raw data from 1934 elections).
170. Id.
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The Farmer-Labor Party's failure to enact a promajoritarian plan, despite
its structural advantages, likely resulted from a set of political constraints.
First, the at-large elections were not popular, apparently due to the loss of
descriptive representation discussed in Section III.B.2.' In 1931 and 1932,
Olson had been able to take advantage of the at-large elections while blam-
ing the Republicans for their occurrence. 72 But he would likely have been
unwilling to drive too hard of a bargain and risk taking the blame himself
should at-large elections result again. Second, the public response against
the 1931 Republican plan showed that the Minnesota electorate had a low
tolerance for gerrymandering. 3 After seizing the moral high ground on the
issue in 1931, Olson likely did not want the public to see him engaging in
the same tactics. 174 Given that the plan adopted in 1933 had many similari-
ties with the plan Olson had presented in 193 1,17 Olson may have exposed
himself to charges of hypocrisy had he driven too hard for a more favorable
plan.
In addition to these political constraints, the 1933 redistricting plan may
also have served the Farmer-Labor Party so poorly because Farmer-Labor
negotiators simply miscalculated, believing that the plan would be more
beneficial to their partisans than it ultimately was. Although in 1933 "[t]he
new second district seem[ed] almost made to order for [Farmer-Labor] Con-
gressman Henry rens, Arens lost the seat to Democratic candidate
Elmer Ryan. 77 Likewise, over strenuous Republican opposition, the 1933
redistricting bill moved Magnus Johnson, the Farmer-Labor congressman
with the strongest statewide popularity, into the Sixth District to challenge
Republican Congressman Harold Knutson.' Yet Knutson managed to defeat
171. E.g., Editorial, supra note 42 ("After one experiment with an election of congressmen at
large, it is not likely that Minnesota would care to try it again.").
172. See supra text accompanying note 97.
173. MAYER, supra note 4, at 70-71.
174. The Minneapolis Journal approvingly noted:
The [1933] congressional apportionment, largely a farmer-labor job, is more equal in district
populations, and less of a gerrymander, than the late lamented act of 1931, which was framed
mainly by republicans.
... This year's molding of congressional districts is a pretty good working out of the problem.
On the map the districts look as compact as can be expected and, in addition, have similarity of
economic interest....
Charles B. Cheney, Minnesota Politics, MINNEAPOLIS J., Apr. 8, 1933, at 4.
175. Compare Olson and Arens Disparity Noted in Redistricting, supra note 84 (providing
map of Olson's proposed districts), with Mike Holm, Minn. Sec'y of State, Map of Congressional
Districts of Minnesota, 1933 (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society, Minnesota State
Archives, I 12.B.19.4(F)).
176. Cheney, supra note 174.
177. 1934 Election Results, supra note 168.
178. Cheney, supra note 174.
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Johnson by over 10,000 votes.' And in the Eighth District, Farmer-Labor
Congressman FH. Shoemaker ran as an independent against the party's en-
dorsed candidate, A.J. Winterquist.'8 As a result, Republican Congressman
William Pittenger won in that district with less than 40,000 votes, compared
to over 25,000 each for Shoemaker and Winterquist."'5 If Farmer-Labor ne-
gotiators had expected to win any or all of these seats, they would have
believed the plan to be more promajoritarian than it turned out to be.
B. Other Concerns with At-Large Elections
Although the at-large elections did not demonstrate severe partisan bias,
critics of multimember representation raise other concerns as well. This
Section examines whether the results of the 1932 congressional elections in
Minnesota exhibited two other concerns with at-large elections. Section
III.B.1 examines concerns that the at-large elections would lead to voter
confusion, and concludes these concerns were unfounded. Section III.B.2
concludes, however, that concerns that the at-large elections would lead to
underrepresentation of small sectional interests were well-founded, poten-
tially affecting negatively the descriptive representational interests of those
communities.
1. Voter Confusion
Although courts have frequently expressed concern that at-large elec-
tions create voter confusion,} 2 the experience of Minnesota in 1932 offers
no evidence for the validity of this concern. Before the elections took place,
however, many in the state argued that the large number of names on the
ballot would prevent voters from making an informed choice. The Pioneer
Press declared that "Minnesota is about to see more politics and in many
respects, worse politics, than this state ever knew existed."'' 13 Paul Kvale, the
only incumbent Farmer-Labor congressman, agreed, sending a telegram to
Governor Olson saying,
I feel profoundly convinced that any additional cost to [the] state of effect-
ing satisfactory reapportionment would be eminentely [sic] justified in
view of the great importance to voters of the state of having election intel-
ligently and honestly conducted.... Can any impartial and reasonably
179. 1934 Election Results, supra note 168
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. For example, in Legislature v. Reinecke, the California Supreme Court declared that it
would draw districts rather than permit at-large elections for California's five new congressional
seats because at-large elections would "impede the casting of informed ballots" by "increasing the
choices confronting the electorate from the candidates for one to the candidates for six congres-
sional seats." Legislature v. Reinecke, 492 P.2d 385, 390 (Cal. 1972); see also Connor v. Finch, 431
U.S. 407,415 (1977); Larios v. Cox, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1218 (N.D. Ga. 2004); Gorin v. Karpan,
775 F. Supp. 1430, 1447 n.23 (D. Wyo. 1991).
183. Editorial, supra note 136, at 5.
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capable observer predict even a fair opportunity for exercise of deliberate
judgment by any but a very few voters .... If conducted at large I can
foresee irreparable damage to principles which you have always fought
splendidly for and which have meant much to many other leaders in our
preservation of clean and honest and intelligent voting in the State of
Minnesota. I venture to predict that if election is held at large and if certain
groups see possibility of controlling nine elected representatives through
expenditure of pooled finances and energies we will see in Minnesota such
a debauch of advertising[,] speaking[,] broadcasting[,] and other activities
as the state has not witnessed in its history9
Republican Congressman William Pittenger noted Congressman Kvale's
opposition to at-large elections, despite the benefit of such elections to the
Farmer-Labor Party. He sent a telegram labeled "Confidential" to an ally
whom he urged to visit the governor and lobby for a special session to pass
a new redistricting bill before the election.'85 The Pioneer Press published
Congressman Kvale's concerns that "a primary campaign with possibly 25
or 30 candidates for Congress in each party would reduce the elective proc-
ess to a farce. The chances of obtaining the most able among such a horde
of candidates would be very slight indeed."
86
Secretary of State Holm shared the concern over manageability and sug-
gested simplifying the process by eliminating the need for a primary. He
called upon the parties to endorse a slate of nine candidates at their state
conventions. This would "dissuade many office seekers from filing since
they would realize the futility of seeking the nomination."8 7 Many in the
parties supported this idea, but it failed. The Republicans declined to en-
dorse a slate, fearful of a convention pitting established congressmen against
more popular challengers.'" The Democratic Party divided into two conven-
tions, one of liberals supporting Olson and Democratic presidential
candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt against another of moderates supporting Al
Smith for president and calling for a strong Democratic gubernatorial candi-
date. The champions of the two Democratic conventions then faced each
other in the primary. "9 The Farmer-Labor Party left its decision to its Execu-
tive Committee, which also declined to endorse a slate.'9° In all, twenty
Democrats, thirty-two Republicans, and thirty-five Farmer-Laborites filed in
184. Telegram from Paul John Kvale, U.S. Representative, State of Minn., to Floyd B. Olson,
Governor, State of Minn. (Apr. 11, 1932) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society, Governor
Misc. Records 110.1.17.4(R)).
185. Telegram from William A. Pittenger, U.S. Representative, State of Minn., to Henry L.
Morin (Apr. 14, 1932) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society, Minnesota State Archives,
Gov. Olson's Admin. Ill F. 18.2(F)).
186. Editorial, supra note 124.
187. Panies' Indorsetents for Congress Is Urged to Simplify Primaries, THE MINNEAPOLIS
TRIB., Apr. 13, 1932, at 1.
188. C.D. Johnston, Party Decisions Presage Bitter Battle in State, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Apr. 14, 1932, at 1.
189. GIESKE, supra note 3, at 157.
190. Johnston, supra note 135.
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the primary.'9' The large number of candidates cluttered the primary ballot,
and the general election ballot was not much better. A sample general elec-
tion ballot for Hennepin County, published in the Minneapolis Tribune,
showed nearly a quarter of the space devoted to the congressional race, with
twenty-seven members of the major parties, three Communists nominated
by petition, and space for nine write-in candidates.1
92
Yet despite these concerns, voter confusion appears to have been mini-
mal. No public sources reported election irregularities, and the level of split-
ticket voting in the general election suggests that voters knew enough about
the candidates to choose them as individuals. Likewise, no news reports
suggested that voter confusion tainted the victory of the Farmer-Labor can-
didates. The only complication reported by the newspapers was that the
public did not learn of the final result for over a week because only a small
number of votes separated the candidates in positions seven through ten.'9
2. Underrepresentation of Minority Interests
The Minnesota experience does, however, lend credence to another con-
cern regarding at-large elections: they frustrate the ability of minority
groups to elect one of their own to Congress, thus impinging on their de-
scriptive representational interests. 94 In Minnesota's 1932 elections, people
from the less populous northern part of the state raised this complaint, argu-
ing that at-large elections would be biased toward candidates from the Twin
Cities. Senator Charles Adams of Duluth feared that "to elect congressmen
at large is unfair to the sitting congressmen and to the people of the existing
congressional districts .... The tendency will be to select as congressmen
the best known candidates residing in the three large cities [Minneapolis,
Saint Paul, and Duluth].' 95 A representative of the Clearwater Farm Bureau
argued that "if the congressmen are elected at large, that the agricultural sec-
tions, especially the northern section, will suffer."'' 96 The Mankato Free Press
declared at-large elections "a serious menace to the agricultural districts of the
state" and predicted that "a majority if not the entire congressional delegation"
might come from the Twin Cities.' 97 And one angry constituent complained to
191. GIESKE, supra note 3, at 162.
192. Complete List of Candidates to Be Voted On In Hennepin County, MINNEAPOLIS TRiB.,
Nov. 6, 1932, at 3.
193. New Election Seen for Seat of Shoemaker, MINNEAPOLIS TRIB., Nov. 14, 1932, at 1.
194. See generally, e.g., Susan Welch, The Impact of At-Large Election on the Representation
of Blacks and Hispanics, 52 J. POL. 1050, 1050 (1990) ("The finding that at-large systems make
'fair' minority representation difficult if not impossible is at the heart of challenges to the at-large
system.").
195. Orlin Folwick, Governor Opposes Legislative Session on Apportionment, THE
MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE, Apr. 12, 1932, at 1.
196. Letter from Herbert V. Anderson, President, Clearwater County Farm Bureau, to A.J.
Olson (Apr. 22, 1932) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society, Minnesota State Archives,
Gov. Olson's Admin. I1.E 18.2(F)).
197. Editorial, It is Your Duty; Governor, MANKATO FREE PRESS, Apr. 12, 1932, at 1.
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Governor Olson, "[T]he big interests that center in Minneapolis are likely, by
much expenditures of money, to nominate the candidates on both tickets and
leave us farmers without much of a chance for representation. You better call a
special session of the legislature and have it fixed up."' 98
The results of Minnesota's at-large elections validated these concerns:
although several of the new congressmen haled from rural areas in the
southern part of the state, residents of northern Minnesota, constituting a
majority of the state's land area, had no representatives in Congress. The
Minneapolis Journal noted that "the entire state delegation in the next con-
gress will come from the lower third of the state .... It gives Minneapolis
three congressmen, the old third district three, the seventh district two, and
Anoka, in the old tenth district, one."'9 9 The Minneapolis Tribune ran a map
of the state, with the homes of leaders in the congressional race, showing
none further north than St. Cloud.2°° Thus, the at-large elections did not
serve well the descriptive representational interest people in northern
Minnesota might have had in seeing one of their own serve in Congress.
CONCLUSION
Following the 1930 Census, the Republican majority in the Minnesota
Legislature attempted to bypass the governor and enact a countermajori-
tarian redistricting plan to protect Republican congressional incumbents
from their predicted defeats. In Smiley v. Holm, the U.S. Supreme Court
guaranteed the governor's role in the redistricting process and established
at-large elections as the reversionary plan that would take effect if the state
failed to enact an alternative plan. This decision effectively limited the abil-
ity of a political party to use the redistricting process to increase partisan
bias and limit responsiveness to protect its seat share from the contrary
wishes of the electorate. The decision similarly ensured that future bargains
over redistricting would not result in countermajoritarian gerrymanders. And
although the 1932 at-large elections left the citizens of large areas of the
state without local representation, political circumstances in Minnesota en-
sured that the elections did not cause the two other major concerns courts
frequently associate with at-large elections: promajoritarian partisan bias
and voter confusion.
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